Abstract-Benefited from cloud storage services, users can save their cost of buying expensive storage and application servers, as well as deploying and maintaining applications. Meanwhile they lost the physical control of their data. So effective methods are needed to verify the correctness of the data stored at cloud servers, which are the research issues the Provable Data Possession (PDP) faced. The most important features in PDP are: 1) supporting for public, unlimited numbers of times of verification; 2) supporting for dynamic data update; 3) efficiency of storage space and computing. In mobile cloud computing, mobile end-users also need the PDP service. However, the computing workloads and storage burden of client in existing PDP schemes are too heavy to be directly used by the resource-constrained mobile devices. To solve this problem, with the integration of the trusted computing technology, this paper proposes a novel public PDP scheme, in which the trusted third-party agent (TPA) takes over most of the calculations from the mobile end-users. By using bilinear signature and Merkle hash tree (MHT), the scheme aggregates the verification tokens of the data file into one small signature to reduce communication and storage burden. MHT is also helpful to support dynamic data update. In our framework, the mobile terminal devices only need to generate some secret keys and random numbers with the help of trusted platform model (TPM) chips, and the needed computing workload and storage space is fit for mobile devices. Our scheme realizes provable secure storage service for resource-constrained mobile devices in mobile cloud computing.
I. INTRODUCTION
In cloud computing, multi-tenants share the external resources of computing and storage, which allows enterprises and individuals get on-demand computing or storage services from cloud service providers(CSP), such as Amazon's S3 and Google's App Engine, and no longer maintain their local physical machines. However, In this new model, the users put their data on the cloud storage servers maintained by service providers, which deprives the users of their control of the physical possession of data, even though they are the owners of the data. In this case, some new security needs and problems have arisen. At the same time, when one's data are outsourced, he wants to know whether the data is truly stored at the correct servers and be intact as stated in the Service Level Agreement (SLA). In addition, in multi-layer cloud services framework, higher layer cloud applications need lower layer services (such as storage service or virtual machine image service).In this circumstance, higher layer CSP needs effective methods to verify the basic storage services provided by lower CSP. It is the problem that the important direction of the current research field in cloud computing -provable data possession (PDP) -wants to solve. On the basis of PDP, if servers ensure the clients can retrieve correct data files with the help of erasure codes, such as Reed-Solomon codes, the services are named as Proofs of Retrievability (POR).
The first solutions to this issue are proposed by Deswarte et al. [1] and Filho et al. [2] , which both use RSA-based functions to hash the whole data file for every verification challenge. Obviously, both of them are inefficient for big data files, which need more time to compute and transfer their hash values. Ateniese et al. [3] proposed a formal definition and related operations of the PDP model. They use some homomorphic tokens in the encoded file to help verify whether the file was tampered without any legal authentication. Juels et al. [4] formally put forward the protocol structure and security framework of the POR model and proposed a method to detect unauthorized changes of data by adding some "sentinels" randomly in the original files. But the above schemes only have limited times of verification operations and do not support public verification. On the basis of the security model in [4] , Shacham et al. [5] designed an improved scheme to realize public data possession verification by using bilinear signature. But in their framework, the number of the authentication tokens stored on the server is proportional to the number of data blocks, and it only is fit for static file storage. Similar to [5] , Wang et al. [6] uses Merkle hash tree (MHT) to build verification tags stored at the servers and support dynamic data update. They treat the leaf nodes of MHT as the left-to-right sequence so that the locations of error data can be detected.
From another perspective, with the prevalence of the 3G and 4G wireless communication networks, the mobile devices, such as mobile phones, PDA, also want to share the benefits introduced by the cloud on-demand storage and computing service. But the traditional mobile terminals are resource-constrained devices (with low CPU frequency and small memory) and can not use the existing PDP schemes directly, which require clients encode files with erasure codes, divide encoded files into blocks and sign on every data blocks. Those operations on large files are intolerable in our mobile computing clients. How to solve this problem is the main goal of our work.
A. Our Contribution
Combined with bilinear map and the well-studied authentication structure-MHT, this paper addresses to design a storage service model with public provable data possession in mobile computing environment. To achieve public verifiability in this environment, we need a trusted third-party auditor (TPA) to do most of the calculation works done by the clients in other PDP schemes. Specifically, our contribution in this paper can be summarized as the following two aspects:
 We use trusted computing technology for the mutual authentication between the end-users and the TPA so that the most computations of the end-users can be done by TPA. The end users only need to generate some passwords and a small amount of random numbers, which can be done by the TPM chips embedded in their machines.  We improve the existing PDP schemes (especially the work proposed in [6] ) with bilinear mapping signature to make them fit for the mobile computing environment. To the best of our knowledge, our scheme is the first storage framework in mobile cloud computing to support the stateless verification, public provable data possession, dynamic data update, and is provably secure in random oracle model.
B. Paper Structure
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II introduces the related works. Then we provide the description of our scheme in Section III, including model structure, notation and preliminaries, important functions and detailed implement of our scheme. Section IV gives the security analysis and performance evaluation, followed by Section V which gives the concluding remark of the whole paper and overviews the related work finally.
II. RELATED WORKS
Ateniese et al. [3] proposed the first formal definition of the PDP model and related operations, functions. In their system some homomorphic verifiable tags are used to verify data file. Juels et al. [4] proposed a formal definition of POR and its security model. After being encrypted and divided into small data blocks, which are encoded with Reed-Solomon codes, the data file is added into some "sentinels" to detect whether it was intact. However, the both schemes don not support dynamic data update and can only verify limited times because that the two schemes only have finite number of the "sentinels" in a file. When the finite "sentinels" are exhausted, the file must be send back to the owner to re-compute new "sentinels". In their improved work, Ateniese et al. [7] proposed a new scheme with homomorphic linear authenticators (HLA), of which communication complexity is independent of the file length. Though the scheme supports infinite times of verification, it can not verify publicly.
Chang et al. [8] proposed a remote identity check scheme. By using redactable signature (a kind of homomorphic signature scheme proposed in [9] ), a redactor can calculate a effective signature on a redacted message x' without knowing the private key. This idea can be used in a third-party verification scheme and verifier does not need to know the private key. Shacham et al. [5] proposed two POR schemes: the first uses bilinear signature, and is provable secure and efficient in the random oracle model. The second depends on pseudo-random function and bilinear map, and is provable secure in the standard model. Both schemes rely on the homomorphic property--aggregating the verification proofs into a small value. However, the above two methods are not aware of the user's privacy preserving in public audit.
An effective public PDP scheme should have the two important following properties [10] :
 To allow a TPA to verify the correctness and integrity of the data without retrieving a copy of the whole data or introducing additional on-line burden to the clients.  To avoid introducing new vulnerabilities to the privacy of the data. Wang et al. [6, 10] discussed the privacy protection in public audit. In their framework, the third-party audit protocol with the privacy preserving is independent of data encryption. By using homomorphic authenticator and random masking, the scheme conceals the content of the original data from TPA and TPA can perform multiple auditing tasks in a batch manner.
Erway et al. [11] is the first to support dynamic data update by using rank-based verification skip list in cloud servers. The most similar PDP scheme to ours was proposed by Wang et al. [6] , which is also our work's basis. Their scheme supports public data possession verification and dynamic data update at the same time. It improves the previous PDP models by using the classical MHT and enables TPA to complete privacy-preserved data integrity check with the support of dynamic data update. This method does not require user's real-time participation in the cloud, and avoids the leakage of user's privacy. However, it still requires the user to calculate initial verification tokens of the files, which is not suitable for this paper's application environment.
If the TPA takes over a large number of computing works of the mobile end-users, first of all, the TPA should achieve mutual authentication with the end-users, and establish a secure transmission channel on this basis. A feasible method is to take the advantage of the trusted computing technology, which is a mature technology, but has few successful applications applied in the cloud computing and few concrete frameworks designed. EMC China lab collaborated with Fudan University, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Tsinghua University and Wuhan University to carry out a research projects on trusted virtual infrastructure, named Daoli [12] . The research project is committed to tenants' isolation and protection platform provider away from attacks by malicious tenants in multi-tenant cloud computing environments. Combination trusted computing with virtualization technologies to enhance the security of computing platforms, makes cloud service providers being able to provide virtual private cloud (VPC) services in public cloud. In [13] , the authors discussed how to use TCB for security enhancements in Xen-a famous open-sourced virtual machine monitor can be used in cloud computing-and described how this method is used to achieve "trusted virtualization" and enhance the security of the virtual TPM. They moved the new VM creation function to a small trusted VM out of Dom0. This method has two main goals: the one is to reduce and bound the size of TCB in Xen-based systems, especially remove the user space in Dom0 from the TCB, to enhance security. Another one is that if we suppose TCB were security, the new VM would have maintained the same attributes of the security and integrity with physical machine. The privacy manager discussed in [14] uses TPM to manage privacy keys required in privacy protection. Trusted computing technology to the IaaS cloud computing systems was introduced in [15] . In Eucalyptus, for example, the authors used a Trusted Coordinator (TC) (maintained by an external trusted entity) to combine unreliable cloud Manager (CM) with a number of trusted nodes in order to form its main architecture. This framework ensures the safety of the customers VM, allows users to verify the IaaS service providers and determine whether the services are security before they start VM.
However, about the combination with trusted computing and cloud computing, the schemes mentioned above did not enhance the security and integrity of the cloud storage services with the provable data possession, which is a critical measure to enhance the user's confidence in using the cloud storage services, especially in wireless mobile computing environment. To the best of our knowledge, our scheme is the first to explore the application of PDP scheme in mobile computing environment combined with the trusted computing.
III. OUR SCHEME

A. Model Structure
System participants: as shown in Figure 1 , in our resource-constrained public provable data possession scheme of the cloud storage service, there are three main participants: 1)client, i.e. mobile end-user, which has a TPM chip and stores data files in the cloud, and expects to get trusted storage validation; 2) trusted third party auditor (TPA), which is credible for clients and take the main file encryption and authentication tasks required during the process of the scheme; 3) cloud storage service provider (CSP), which has a large capacity of storage and provides the users with storage services and the proof of data possession when needed.
In the mobile computing environment, the client's computing and storage capacity is very limited, but it has the ability to use its TPM chips to produce and store secret keys. The TPA is acted by a service agent located between the mobile access point and the gateway of the IP network services. The TPA should have high performance of computing but limited storage space, which is only for small part of the information of the clients and the current session message. In addition, it should connect securely with the client for providing services. Through Internet, the CSP provides high-capacity, redundant storage services. Generally speaking, the CSP is an unsafe, even malicious entity. That is to say, for some financial benefits, it is possible to read, tamper or delete the user's original files, even to forge the proof of the data possession. So the files should be encrypted before sending to the CSP. In this paper, we assume all parties communicate through secure, reliable, authenticated channels for all phases。 Security goal: In this system, the client and the TPA need to establish a secure link. On the basis of security of the underlying communication link between the mobile terminal and the TPA, firstly, through the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol, the scheme generates a symmetric key for data exchange. Except for some necessary keys and random values, the client does not perform additional computation works, which are taken over by the TPA. The scheme is secure under the random oracle model and our security model is based on the one proposed in [6] .
Design goal: The scheme has three design goals shown as followed.
 public provable data possession: to allow a verifier, not just the data owner or users, to have the capability to verify the correctness of the stored data on demand;  stateless verification: to generate the proofs of data possession according to the challenge produced randomly by the verifier, not to the persistent information maintained by some entities;  resource-constrained mobile environment support:
to allow end-user just to generate and store the keys by utilizing TPM chip instead of doing lots of computing works, which are done by the TPA now;  trusted computing technology applying: to build a trusted channel between the TPA and the client, then use it to transfer the related messages and authorize the TPA to complete those works for reduce the client's workload.
B. Notation and Preliminaries
Diffie-Hellman protocol. Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol is one of the most famous schemes in cryptography, which mainly utilize the discrete log problem to safely exchange a shared symmetric key through an unsecured channel. By using this method, the end-user and the TPA can share a symmetric key so that the data files, asymmetric keys and the information of the verification can be transferred safely after being encrypted by this key.
Merkle hash tree. A Merkle Hash Tree (MHT) is a well-studied authentication structure [16] , which can efficiently and securely prove that a set of data blocks are undamaged and unaltered. It is constructed as a binary tree where the leaves in the Merkle hash tree are the hash values of authentic data. During the process of the verification, the verifier only needs check whether the root value of the tree is tampered. In the archive [6] , their scheme treats the leaf nodes as the left-to-right sequence for getting the positions of error data blocks. For the sake of simplicity, in our scheme, MHT tree leaf nodes only store the hash of data blocks. 
, where g is a generator of G 1 .
C. Some Important Procedures:
Improved from [4, 6, 17] , our secure storage system with provable data possession contains the following functions:
KenGen(1 k ) → (pk,sk) : This algorithm takes as input initial secure parameter 1 k , and returns the public key pk and the private key sk. In our scheme, the end-user generates and maintains the keys in TPM chip.
Encap ek (F) → F':
The TPA uses this algorithm to encrypt the raw file F with the seal key ek and encode it with erasure codes. It returns the sealed file F'.
SigGen_Client sk (F') → Sig sk (H(R)):
This algorithm is run by end-users. It takes as input the hash value of the root of the MHT and outputs its signature as a metadata.
SigGen_TPA(F') → Ф:
This algorithm is run by TPA. It takes as input each data blocks {m i } of the sealed file F', and outputs the signature collection Ф= { σ i } on {m i }.
GenProof(chal, F', Sig sk (H(R)), Ф) → (P):
This algorithm is run by the storage server. It takes as input the verification challenge message "chal" generated by TPA, the stored file F', the metadata signature and the signature set Ф, and returns the possession proof P.
Verify(P, chal) → {TRUE|FALSE}: By run this algorithm, according to the random challenge chal, the proof P returned from the server and some metadata of the end-user, the TPA verify the correctness of the data file, and outputs TRUE if the integrity of the file is verified as correct, or FALSE otherwise.
Decap dk (F') →F:
The end-user request to extract a file F, and the TPA retrievals the corresponding sealed file F' from the cloud, decodes and decrypts the file to get F with the decryption key (dk), then sends F to the end-user.
D. Detailed Implementation
For implementing the public provable data possession of the cloud storage service in our background, first of all, a trusted communication channel should be build between the TPA and the mobile end-user, which needs mutual remote identification. This issue will be discussed more detail later in this paper. After mutual identification, by utilizing the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol, the TPA and the end-user negotiate a symmetric key for the exchange of other information in this scheme. Now we start to present the main idea of our scheme. According to the model defined in [4, 6, 10, 17] , we assume the raw data file F is first encrypted by the key (ek) and encoded into F' using erasure codes, then the F' is divided into N blocks {m i }, where m i ∈Zp and 1≤i≤N. Let e: G 1 ×G 1 →G 2 be a bilinear map, which has a big prime order p and a generator g of group G 1 . Let H: {0,1}*→ G 1 is a hash function. The main procedure of our scheme is as follows:
Setup: In this phase, we assume the end-user has already completed the remote identification with the TPA by using TPM and set up a trusted communication channel. Through this channel, the phase setup is executed as Algorithm 1 described: Algorithm Received the original file F from the client, a pair of asymmetric keys (ek, dk) are generated by invoking KenGen(*), where (ek) is for encrypting the file and (dk) for decrypting after retrieval. By calling Encap ek (F), the TPA encrypts the file, divides it into small blocks and encodes the data blocks with erasure codes. After doing these, the TPA gets N blocks {m i } (1≤i≤N) as the stored file F'. Then, the TPA calculates H(R), the hash value of the root of the MHT, of which the leaves are the hash of the corresponding m i . At last of this turn, the TPA sent the value H(R) and dk to the client encrypted with the shared key
By running SigGen_Client sk (F'), the client signs H(R) and sent the signature of H(R) back to the TPA. The TPA calls SigGen_TPA(F') to calculate the signature collections of each blocks of F', then sends {Sig sk (H(R)), F', Ф} to the cloud storage servers. In algorithm 1, u is a element in G 1 chosen randomly by the TPA.
Integrity verification: This phase starts from the client or the TPA by sending a verification challenge to the cloud storage service provider (CSP). According to the challenge, the CSP computes the proof of verification and sends it back to the TPA. After verifying the proof, the TPA sends the result to the client. The detail process of verification is shown as the algorithm 2: The challenge message "chal" is generated by TPA. The TPA chooses c random numbers in the set [1, N] to constitute a sequence subset I. For each i∈I, the TPA picks a random element v i ∈Zp. The challenge message "chal" sent to CSP is composed of the number i and the corresponding v i . On receiving the "chal", the CSP runs GenProof(chal, F', Sigsk (H(R)), Ф) to generate the proof, which includes the corresponding hash value H(m i ) of the data blocks {m i } for every i∈I and the additional information Ω i for rebuilding the root H(R) of the MHT. In addition, the CSP also computes the following two values as a part of the proof: If so, the Verify(*) returns TRUE; otherwise FALSE. File retrieval: Before retrieval, the client and the TPA should negotiate a symmetric session key Ks through Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol. Then, shown as algorithm 3, the client sends the decryption key (dk) encrypted by Ks to the TPA and the TPA request the CSP for extracting the file F'. The CSP sends F' to the TPA. Then the TPA runs Decap dk (F') to get the raw file F and send F to the end-user through a secure communication channel. Noted that, we do not include the process of negotiation of the symmetric session key Ks in the above description of algorithm 3.
E. Discussions
Remote identification: As stated above, the client and the TPA use a symmetric key generated through the Diffie-Hellman protocol to encrypt the original file, the secret information, the hash value of the root of the Merkle hash tree and some control information transferred between them. But before that, both of them need remote mutual identification. On one hand, based on trusted computing idea, we assume that the TPA is trusted in mobile computing environment. That is to say, the client does not need to identify the TPA. On the other hand, the client is attested by answering the challenge of TPA with a message signed by the Attestation Identity Key (AIK), which is created and maintained by the TPM chip embedded in the client's device. There are lots of schemes to solve this problem. Because this paper focuses on the mobile computing, we can adopt the scheme proposed by Yang et al. [18] to realize the remote identification in wireless environment.
Verification equation: During the verification phase, if the information stored at the cloud has not been tampered, replaced or deleted, according to the properties of bilinear map, the correctness of Eq. (1) can be elaborated as follows:
And the one of equation (2) can be proved as follows: [6] , that the equation 1 and 2 are satisfied can ensure the data stored at the cloud storage servers are correct and intact under the random oracle model. In additional, for the privacy and the confidentiality, the TPA encrypts the raw file with the key (ek) and decrypt with the key (dk) when it sends and retrieves the file respectively. The asymmetric key pair (ek, dk) is created by the TPA. Because the TPA maybe need provider the verification service for multi-user in a real circumstance, according to the TPM main specification v1.2 [19] , in our scheme there are two ways to maintain the key pair. One way is to use TPM_Bind to bind the key pair and store it on the TPA. Another solution is, as shown in algorithm 1, that the decryption key (dk), which encrypted by the symmetric key shared between the client and the TPA, can be sent to the client and sent back to the TPA during extracting the file.
Supporting dynamic data update: the scheme in [6] has already supported dynamic data update with the operation on the Merkle hash tree, so our scheme also has this property. Because in our mobile computing environment, a lot of calculations on mobile device are not meaningful, we do not intend to discuss this issue in detail.
IV. SECURITY AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS
A. Security Analysis:
As mentioned above, an important basis of our scheme is building a secure information transferring channel between the client and the TPA. The TPA, which we assume is trusted, can authenticate the client based on hardware TPM chip embedded in the device of the client. By using Diffie-Hellman key exchange, the two entities can share a symmetric key to ensure the data files and signatures transferred between them are more secure. Furthermore, the trusted computing technology can also help them to avoid Man-in-the-middle attack during the process of the Diffie-Hellman key exchange.
The file transferred between the TPA and the CSP is encrypted and encoded file F', which avoid the CPS knowing the content of file and ensure the privacy and confidentiality of the raw file. The signature structure of MHT is the basis of keeping the integrity of data. That the root signature of the MHT is computed by the end-user can avoid the leakage of the user's private key. As for the security analysis of the bilinear map in PDP schemes, archives [5] [6] 10] have exhaustive description, so we will not discuss it in detail.
B. Performance Analysis:
According algorithm 1 and 2, we can demonstrate the overall workload of the computing and storage of each parties in our scheme as followed:
 Mobile terminal: stores the private key α and decryption key dk of file; computes the public key  g and the signature Sig sk (H(R)) of the MHT root H(R).  TPA: stores the user's public key  g ; encodes/decodes, encrypts/decrypts the file, computes the data blocks signature collection Ф, and verifies the two equations during verification.  CSP: stores the signature Sig sk (H(R)), the encoded F' and the Ф; generates the verification information μ and ω, and computes the Ω i for recovering the MHT. It should be noted that we do not include the workloads for generating the needed random numbers and nonce of every entity in our scheme.
As described above, through a trusted channel between the end-user and the TPA, the heavy works, such as encoding (decoding), encryption (decryption) of the file, can be moved to the TPA to be done, and the end-user only need to generate keys and sign the root of the MHT. So our scheme realized the goal: the storage space and the computing ability needed for end-user during verifying the data possession are as small as possible, which is fit for the mobile computing device, such as mobile phone and PDA, etc.
By using the MHT idea, the data blocks signatures are aggregated into the signature of the root of the MHT to verify the data integrity with a minimum of storage space. The root signature is put into the cloud server, which realized the stateless verification. The MHT can also help to implement the dynamic data update as described in [6] .
V. CONCLUSIONS
When the resource-constrained mobile devices use the cloud storage services deployed on traditional IP networks, the end-users are most concerned about whether the CSP stores their files correctly and dutifully. On the basis of the existing researches on PDP and POR, a secure storage scheme with public provable data possession of the mobile devices in cloud computing is proposed in this paper. Through the remote authentification of the mobile end-user by using trusted computing technology, a trusted third-party agent can undertake most computing workload of the client in traditional PDP, which makes our scheme be fit for the mobile computing environment. Combined with MHT and bilinear signature, improved the framework and related algorithms from the existing PDP schemes, our scheme realized public PDP with the support of dynamic data update. The scheme is provable secure under the random oracle model as proved in [6] . To the best of our knowledge, our scheme is the first to explore the application of PDP scheme in mobile computing environment combined with the trusted computing.
Our future works include building a prototype system to test the performance of our scheme and exploring the application of other PDP framework applied in secure storage services of mobile computing environment.
